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PUTTING TEETH INTO A.B. 109: WHY 
CALIFORNIA’S HISTORIC PUBLIC 
SAFETY REALIGNMENT ACT SHOULD 
REQUIRE REENTRY PROGRAMMING 
KATHLEEN NYE FLYNN* 
 
Reentry processes fail for several reasons—inadequate 
programming, inadequate resources, punitive approaches, and mixed 
messages to all sorts of stakeholders. The confusing and conflicting 
messages of current programming merely serve to delegitimize the 
reentry process (and correctional programming), and to contribute to the 
cynicism that society does not desire for offenders to succeed. 
—FAYE S. TAXMAN1 
INTRODUCTION 
In April 2011, Governor Jerry Brown orchestrated the most 
significant change to California’s prison system in the state’s recent 
history:2 the passage of the Public Safety Realignment Act of 2011, also 
  *J.D., 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, CA; M.A. Journalism, 
2008, Columbia University, New York, NY; B.A., double major in Political Science and Journalism, 
2004, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA.  I wish to thank Steven for his endless 
encouragement, my newborn daughter for her patience during the revision process, and her 
grandparents for caring for her, even when her patience ran out.  Thank you also to Alexandra 
Vesalga for her support, and to the academics, officials, students and advocates who have produced 
such an interesting body of research on this topic. 
 1 Faye S. Taxman, The Cattle Call of Reentry, Not All Processes Are Equal, 10 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 925, 934-35 (2011). 
 2 For example, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation calls it 
“historic” and the “cornerstone of California’s solution for reducing the number of inmates” in the 
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known by its primary bill, Assembly Bill 109.3  The Act, which took 
effect in October 2011, set out to transfer an estimated fifty thousand 
people from state supervision to the control of county probation and 
sheriffs’ departments.4  Another estimated thirty thousand people who 
would otherwise have been sentenced to state prison will reside in county 
jails.5  The result is that county jails now serve more inmates, and the 
State is relying more than ever on local social-service providers to help 
former inmates reenter mainstream society.6  Realignment has 
dramatically impacted county government and courts, people in prison 
and those being released into parole, as well as local communities.7  
Overall, it is vastly transforming the role of probation by encouraging 
State’s prisons.  Public Safety Realignment, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, 
ww.cd
, Comm. on Budget (Cal. 2011); S.B. 89, 2013 Comm. on Budget and 







is Comment will primarily outline its effect on county probation departments’ 
w cr.ca.gov/realignment (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 3 A.B. 109, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). In accordance with local practice, this 
Comment will use the abbreviation “A.B.” to cite California Assembly Bills.  Although the prison 
realignment is most often referred to as “A.B. 109” by local officials and the media, realignment 
encompasses various bills, including modifying bill A.B. 117, 2011 Leg., Comm. on Budget (Cal. 
2011); A.B. 118, 2011 Leg.
Fiscal Review (Cal. 2013). 
 4 DEAN MISCZYNSKI, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT
L  (Aug. 2012), available at www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_812DMR.pdf. 
 5 Id.  To clarify, in California, probation and parole both involve supervision of criminal 
offenders in the counties of which they were residents prior to committing their crimes.  However, 
parole specifically refers to felony offenders who were sentenced to state prison and who have been 
released to state officials after completing a portion of their state-prison sentences.  Meanwhile, 
probation occurs only on a county level and is a sentencing option for offenders who have 
committed either misdemeanors or felonies.  Probation officers are responsible for connecting 
offenders with other stakeholders in the system, such as law enforcement, the courts, community-
based organizations, mental health departments, substance abuse clinics, and the community.  See 
MARCUS NIETO, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA
C AL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (1996), available at www.library.ca.gov/crb/96/06/96006.pdf. 
 6 See generally CAL. STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES ET AL., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY 
REALIGNMENT, KEY PROVISIONS IN AB 109/AB 117: ADULT OFFENDERS POPULATION TRANSFERS 
TO COUNTIES (2011), available at www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhda%20files/committee
forensics/1107_forensics/csac-cssa-cpoc_2011_public_safety_realignment_key_provisions_(7-22-
11).pdf [hereinafter KEY PROVISIONS].  See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(6) (Westlaw 2013) 
(“Community-based corrections programs require a partnership between local public safety entities 
and the county to provide and expand the use of community-based punishment for low-lev
of  populations.”).  The specific changes created by realignment are discussed infra Part I.D. 
 7 See generally KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, for an overview of how realignment affects 
county governments, courts, parolees, and communities.  The legislation also involves changing the 
definitions of a number of crimes, enabling counties to make more use of electronic monitoring of 
offenders, and changing rules governing good-time credits.  While the legislation has many 
components that impact jails, the district attorneys’ and public defenders’ offices, sentencing limits, 
good behavior credits, adult protective services, child welfare programs, adult proactive services, 
and juvenile justice, th
rehabilitation efforts. 
2
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y not establish the rehabilitation services needed to 
redu
 
counties to focus on rehabilitation and lowered recidivism.8  However, 
despite the sweeping changes that realignment generated and its 
grandiose goals of reducing recidivism through rehabilitation, it does not 
require that counties put forward the resources, supervision, and funding 
necessary to make lasting, systemic changes to how incarcerated people 
reintegrate back into society.9  Without sufficient state directives and 
resources counties ma
ce recidivism.10 
The need for reentry reform in the state is clear from the numbers: 
at its height in 2005, the state parole recidivism rate reached 67.5%—
meaning that nearly seven out of ten people who left prison returned 
within three years after release.11  Recidivism rates were high on the 
county level as well: nearly 40% of people on probation returned to jail, 
and many of those people wound up in state prison.12  This recidivism, in 
 
 8 MISCZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 7; see also MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, 
2011 REALIGNMENT: ADDRESSING ISSUES TO PROMOTE ITS LONG-TERM SUCCESS 1 (Aug. 19, 
2011), available at www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/stadm/realignment/realignment_081911.pdf (“The 
2011 realignment legislation is complex and wide sweeping.”). 
 9 See ALLEN HOPPER ET AL., ACLU OF N. CAL., COMMUNITY SAFETY, COMMUNITY 
SOLUTIONS: IMPLEMENTING AB 109: ENHANCING PUBLIC MONEY AND WISELY ALLOCATING JAIL 
SPACE 5 (Aug. 2011), available at www.aclunc.org/issues/criminal_justice/asset_upload_file459 
_10684.pdf (explaining that the intent of realignment is for counties to “focus on non-incarceration 
alternatives” because counties “will not have the resources” to either build new jail beds or contract 
their new jail population back to the State (which is one of the options built into A.B. 109 
legislation)). 
 10 ALLEN HOPPER ET AL., ACLU OF N. CAL., PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT, CALIFORNIA 
AT THE CROSSROADS 12 (Mar. 2012), available at www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/public_ 
safety_realignment_california_at_a_crossroads.pdf.  For the purposes of this Comment, “reentry” 
and “rehabilitative services” as part of a probationary sentence refer broadly to such programs as 
housing services (including short- and long-term accommodations), employment services, vocational 
training, substance abuse programs, mental health services, expungement programs, educational 
programs, and family-strengthening programs.  These are addressed broadly, as populations will 
have different needs and require different types of services, and programs can vary.  Many of these 
programs are mentioned in A.B. 117 but are not made mandatory.  See Cal. A.B. 117, discussed at 
length infra Part III. 
 11 CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2012 OUTCOME EVALUATION REPORT 13 fig.1 (Oct. 
2012), available at 
www.cdcr.ca.gov/adult_research_branch/Research_Documents/ARB_FY_0708_Recidivism_Report
_10.23.12.pdf (the recidivism rate is measured based on a parolee’s return to prison within three 
years of release).  But see PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR 
TO AMERICA’S PRISONS 17 (Apr. 2011), available at www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpew 
trustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons
%20.pdf (explaining that 40% of California’s recidivism is due to parolees violating parole, as 
opposed to committing new crimes, partly due to the fact that most parolees must remain on parole 
for three years). 
 12 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, ACHIEVING BETTER OUTCOMES FOR ADULT 
PROBATION, fig.10 (May 29, 2009), available at www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/Probation/probation 
_052909.aspx. 
3
Flynn: Putting Teeth into A.B. 109
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013





part, resulted in a population crisis within California’s prisons: at their 
peak, prisons were at 200% of capacity.13  A system designed to hold just 
under 80,000 people had a population more than twice that.14  This crisis 
came to a head in Brown v. Plata, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that overcrowding in California’s prisons amounted to cruel and unusual 
punishment.15  The Court upheld the lower court’s order requiring 
California to reduce its prison population to 137% of design cap
nd of 2013.16  Before the Court had even rendered its verdict, 
Governor Brown responded by drafting realignment measures.17 
While A.B. 109’s ink was still drying, many of California’s fifty-
eight counties began to create realignment plans, following guidelines set 
by statute, in order to prepare for its hasty implementation.18  The Act 
suggested that counties include strategies to reduce recidivism through 
reentry programs, but because the State did not make these efforts 
mandatory, there has been no guarantee that any particular county will 
put the necessary resources toward these services.19  Indeed, a recent 
 13 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923-24 (2011). 




coming—we don’t have a choice.  We will take care 
  A
 14 Id. 
 15 For a detailed account of the litigation process that culminated in the Supreme Court’s 
decision, see Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and
P s, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 178 (2013). 
 16 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1945, 1947.  The original deadline for reducing the population to 
137.5% of capacity was June 2013, but the three-judge panel overseeing the State’s progress gave a 
six-month extension until the end of 2013.  Bob Egelko, Extension Given To Cut Prison Population, 
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 30, 2013, available at 
pr population-4237201.php. 
 17 Schlanger, supra note 15, at 184. 
 18 Counties were required to adopt realignment plans by Oct. 1, 2011.  A.B. 109 mandated 
the formation of an Executive Committee within each county’s Community Corrections Partnership, 
a governing body each county created under a 2009 statute, S.B. 678. CAL. PENAL CODE §§1228-
1233.8 (Westlaw 2012).  Each county’s realignment plan was created by the Executive Committee, 
which is composed of the district attorney, the public defender, the presiding judge, the police chief, 
a public-health or social-services director, and the probation chief.  Each county’s board of 
supervisors was required to approve the plan.  KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 4.  News media 
across the state reported on the creation of these plans.  See, e.g., Julie Small, California Counties To 
Take Responsibility for Low-Level Felons, S. CAL. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 22, 2011), 
www.scpr.org/news/2011/09/22/29010/california-counties-prepare-take-responsibility-lo/ (quoting 
Jerry Powers, Chief Probation Officer for Stanislaus County: “Up and down the state talking to my 
colleagues, there’s a lot of planning going on and a lot of discussion with sheriffs, and courts and 
community-based organizations, and Oct. 1 it’s 
of it. nd come Oct. 1 we’ll be ready to go.”). 
 19 See, e.g., MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE THE 2012-13 BUDGET: THE 
2011 REALIGNMENT OF ADULT OFFENDERS—AN UPDATE 9-10 (Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter 2012-
2013 BUDGET], available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports/docs/External-Reports/2011-realignment-of-
adult-offenders-022212.pdf (providing a breakdown on how county plans have specified funding 
allocations); see also KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 3 (“Supervision and case plans are not 
4
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ons must mandate that counties provide rehabilitation 
prog
ion efforts as part of 
realignment.  Finally, Part IV recommends statutory language that would 
ndatory 
component of the regulations moving forward. 
 
study that reviewed the impact of realignment one year after 
implementation found that counties have spent only 12% of their 
realignment funding on community agencies that provide rehabilitation 
services.20  Realignment recognizes that the treatment of newly released 
inmates greatly contributes to reducing recidivism.  However, a policy 
with these intenti
rams to people exiting incarceration.  Otherwise, prison reform to 
the extent the State intended—and the U.S. Supreme Court demanded—
will not succeed. 
Part I of this Comment provides a history of probation reform 
policies in California and an overview of realignment and its preceding 
litigation, with a focus on components that relate to rehabilitation in post-
release.  Part II explores how Plata laid the groundwork for California’s 
current focus on reform and demonstrates how realignment hinges on 
changing the role of probation, slowing recidivism, and improving 
rehabilitation opportunities.  Part III argues that the State should provide 
mandatory guidelines for county rehabilitat
make rehabilitative programming for probationers a ma
I.  THE LONG ROAD TO THE PRISON REALIGNMENT ACT OF 2011 
The road to California’s most recent attempt at prison realignment 
has been long and vexing, marked by failed attempts at reducing the 
population of state prisons and by funding and sentencing systems that 
have only increased the number of people that counties send to prisons.21  
An examination of California’s most recent prison crisis requires a brief 
review of the state’s history of probation reform, starting in 1965 with 
the Probation Subsidy Act and culminating with Brown v. Plata, which 
resulted in the Supreme Court mandating that the State reduce its prison 
population.22  This litigation led to the Community Corrections 
Performance Incentive Act of 2009 (CCPI), also known as S.B. 67823—
 
specified in [the] statute.”); List of County Plans, CALREALIGNMENT.ORG, www.calrealignment. 
org/county-implementation/list-of-county-plans.html (last visited May 21, 2013). 
 20 Joan Petersilia & Jessica Greenlick Snyder, Looking Past the Hype: 10 Questions 
Everyone Should Ask About California’s Prison Realignment, 5 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 266, 275 
(2013). 
 21 See generally Roger K. Warren, Probation Reform in California: Senate Bill 678, 22 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 186 (Feb. 2010), available at www.courts.ca.gov/documents/probate-sb678.pdf. 
 22 Id.; see also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). 
 23 S.B. 678, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), adding CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1228-
1233.8 (Westlaw 2012). 
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cent litigation—and the 
Realignment Act of 2011, which mandated for the first time in the 
State
prison or jail, who is released on probation, and what happens 
when
California has made multiple attempts to encourage counties to 
retain offenders in county control rather than in state prison, beginning in 
 
the State’s initial attempt at responding to the re
’s history that a high percentage of low-level felons be transferred to 
county control.24 
A.  CALIFORNIA’S PROBATION POLICY HISTORY 
California is one of two states in the nation that leaves the 
responsibility for probation to each of its individual fifty-eight counties, 
providing almost no cohesive statewide guidance.25  With the exception 
of available state grants, counties rely primarily on local funding for 
what can be very extensive probation departments.26  This leads to 
tremendous disparity in the way counties sentence people, whom they 
send to 
 that probation is revoked.27  Indeed, a recent study compared two 
similar-sized counties with similar crime rates, finding that one county 
imprisoned new felons at a rate of more than three times the other and 
put more than twice the number of people into prison per year than the 
other.28 
 
 24 A.B. 109, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
 25 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 21, at 186 (“California is one of only two states in the nation 
that does not provide an ongoing stream of funding to support adult probation services.  California is 
also among a dwindling number of states that have no state system of community corrections.”). 
 26 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12.  Counties receive on average two thirds 
of the funding for probation departments locally, and one fourth from the State.  Other funding 
comes from fees that probationers pay to receive certain rehabilitation services, as well as the federal 
government.  The LAO estimates that in 2007 county probation departments “spent a total of about 
$2 billion for adult and juvenile supervision as well as juvenile detention facilities.”  Id. at 6.  
 time prisoners serve, and in the amount of rehabilitative programming they 
ver, San Bernardino County sent “more than three times as 
any ‘ ear.”  W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State’s Dime): 
However, the amount of state funding has since increased, with the implementation of S.B. 678 in 
2009, which provides incentive funding for counties that limit the number of people they send to 
prison.  See Cal. S.B. 678.  This will be examined infra Part IV. 
 27 DEAN MISCZYNSKI, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., RETHINKING THE STATE-LOCAL 
RELATIONSHIP: CORRECTIONS 25 (Aug. 2011), available at www.ppic.org/content/pubs/ 
report/R_811DMR.pdf (“There are differences in the way counties charge and prosecute crimes, in 
the amount of jail
receive.  Realignment increases the class of prisoners affected, applies these differences to prisoners 
serving longer sentences, and, importantly, increases the discretion that counties have to manage 
their prisoners.”). 
 28 The study involved Alameda and San Bernardino Counties.  A ten-year average of county 
data showed that both counties had similarly sized populations and similar amounts of reported 
violent crime and property crime.  Howe
m new felons’ to prison each y
How Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—and Why It Should, 
28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987, 994 (2012). 
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 which to 
track
sentencing policies, such as the “Three Strikes and You’re Out” laws 
 
 
earnest with the California Probation Subsidy Act of 1965.29  This Act 
grew from the notion that in order to keep prison populations low, 
rehabilitation of the offenders had to occur within the community.30  The 
Act provided counties with $4,000 for each person diverted from state 
prison, altogether redirecting 45,000 offenders from state prison to 
county supervision.31  However, the Act was replaced in 1978 for reasons 
including the fact that the $4,000 funding rate was never increased to 
account for inflation and consequently failed to continue to motivate 
counties to retain their own offenders;32 in addition, as California’s 
sentencing policies grew increasingly strict,33 and courts began 
dispensing more and more felony sentences, the State could not keep up 
with the cost of the increasing offender population.34  Critics faulted the 
Act for incentivizing counties to keep dangerous offenders in the 
community and for lacking performance measurements with
 the success of the programs.35  Most importantly, counties never 
installed the types of rehabilitation services, such as halfway houses and 
day service centers, that could truly reduce recidivism rates.36 
The next significant effort toward reform took place in the 1990s, 
beginning with the Community-Based Punishment Act of 1994.37  
Although the intent was to provide continuous funding for probation 
programs, a sufficient funding stream never emerged.38  The State 
attempted several grant programs in the 1990s, but those programs failed 
as well.39  Simultaneously, the State enacted increasingly tougher 
 29 NIETO, supra note 5, at 8. 
FORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STATE/COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE PARTNERSHIPS IN 
ALIFO BBREVIATED HISTORY 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.pew.org/uploaded 
iles/C
t-time felons, mostly 
ccurri or a brief background on these laws and policy shifts, see CAL. 
UDGE E CORRECTIONS SPENDING IN CALIFORNIA 8 (Sept. 2011), 
14_Corrections_Spending_BB.pdf. 
 CODE §§ 8050-8093 (Westlaw 2013). 
 30 STAN
C RNIA: AN A
F A%20State-County%20Partnerships%20paper.pdf. 
 31 Id.  
 32 Id. at 2. 
 33 Three factors contributed most significantly to the rise in the prison population: 
determinate sentencing, passed in 1976; the enactment of the “Three Strikes, You’re Out” law in 
1994; and changes in local law enforcement and the prosecution of firs
o ng between 1987 and 2007.  F
B T PROJECT, STEADY CLIMB: STAT
/1109available at www.cbp.org/pdfs/2011
 34 NIETO, supra note 5, at 9. 
 35 Warren, supra note 21, at 190. 
 36 NIETO, supra note 5, at 9 
 37 CAL. PENAL
 38 Jessica Feinstein, Reforming Adult Felony Probation To Ease Prison Overcrowding: An 
Overview of California S.B. 678, 14 CHAPMAN L. REV. 375, 387-88 (2011). 
 39 Id. at 388. 
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rs prior.   By 2007, the prison 
population was severely strained: designed to cage only about 80,000 
B.  B
ee of suffering and death.”   The district court 
 
passed by the Legislature and by voters in 1994.40  Stricter sentencing 
resulted in second- and third-strikers becoming one quarter of the state 
prison population.41  Courts began to sentence so many people to prison 
that a felony arrest in 2007 “was almost twice as likely to result in a 
prison sentence” than it was twenty yea 42
people, it held approximately 172,000.43 
ROWN V. PLATA AND ITS PRECEDING LITIGATION 
In Brown v. Plata, California prisoners sued the State over prison 
conditions that they claimed violated their Eighth Amendment rights.44  
Nearly two decades of litigation preceded the case, beginning with 
Coleman v. Wilson, in which incarcerated persons with mental illness 
sued the State for not providing adequate care.45  In 1995, a district court 
issued a series of remedies to improve the situation, to be overseen by a 
special master.46  Twelve years later, the special master reported that the 
prison mental health system had actually worsened.47  In 2001, in Plata 
v. Brown, a class of prisoners with serious medical conditions sued the 
State over Eighth Amendment violations, asserting that the lack of 
adequate prison medical care constituted cruel and unusual punishment.48  
Four years after approving injunctive relief for the plaintiffs, the district 
court found that the prison system’s medical care was still “resulting in 
an ‘unconscionable’ degr 49
 
 40 Specifically, in 2010 state prisons housed 34,365 second-strikers and 8,667 third-strikers, 
which totaled more than a quarter of all inmates.  CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, supra note 33, at 8; see 
lso C
SON CENSUS DATA AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010 
eb. 
ET PROJECT, supra note 33, at 8 (quoting 2009-2010 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S 
FFICE
l punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  Plaintiffs in Plata argued that the 
health care and adequate 
rotect
man v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
a, 131 S. Ct. at 1926. 
a AL. PENAL CODE § 667(b)–(j) (Westlaw 2013) (“Three Strikes” law enacted by Legislature); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (Westlaw 2013) (“Three Strikes” law enacted by electorate). 
 41 Id.; see also DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., PRI
(F 2011), tbl.1., available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/offender_information_ 
services_branch/Annual/Census/CENSUSd1012.pdf. 
 42 CAL. BUDG
O , BUDGET ANALYSIS SERIES: JUDICIAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at CJ-13 (Jan. 30, 2009)). 
 43 Id. at 2, 5. 
 44 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1926 (2011).  The Eighth Amendment protects citizens 
from cruel and unusua
State violated their Eighth Amendment rights by denying access to 
p ion in prisons. 
 45 Cole
 46 Plat
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 1927. 
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 the problem of overcrowding 
is ov
f Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) reduce its prison 
population to 137.5% of the prison system’s design capacity—a 
potential 
solutions, such as hiring new staff, transferring prisoners to other states 
or building new facilities, were ruled out as impossible, given the State’s 
resou
state prison.   Much like the California Probation Subsidy Act of 1965, 
 
 
appointed a receiver, who, over the following three years, monitored the 
prison medical system.50 
Finally, by 2007, the Brown and Coleman cases were combined and 
brought before a three-judge district court convened by the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.51  Throughout two weeks in 2009, the 
three-judge court heard alarming testimony about the status of the prison 
medical system.52  In the end, the court found that overcrowding resulted 
in strained medical and mental health facilities, over-burdened staff, and 
violent and unsanitary conditions:53  “Until
ercome,” the court concluded, “it will be impossible to provide 
constitutionally compliant care to California’s prison population.”54  The 
court ordered the State to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of 
design-capacity within two years.55  The State appealed, and the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.56 
In May 2011, the Supreme Court upheld the three-judge district 
court’s ruling that population reduction provided the only remedy to the 
Eighth Amendment violations.57  It affirmed the order that the California 
Department o
reduction of about 33,000 prisoners—by 2013.58  Other 
rces.59 
C.  LEGISLATIVE ACTION DURING THE PLATA LITIGATION—A 
PRECURSOR TO A.B. 109 
During the three-judge district court’s proceedings, California 
passed S.B. 678 in an effort to reduce the flow of felony probationers to 
60
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 1927-28.  The convening of a three-judge panel was required under the federal 
rzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 THE, 2010 WL 
9000,  2010); see Schlanger, supra note 15, at 180. 
Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3) (Westlaw 2013). 
 52 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1927–28. 
 53 Id. at 1932. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Coleman v. Schwa
. 12,9 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan
 56 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1930. 
 57 Id. at 1947. 
 58 Id. at 1945, 1947. 
 59 Id. at 1937-39. 
 60 S.B. 678, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
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S.B. 678 provides incentive funding to counties that keep probationers 
from being sent to prison.61  “Top-tier counties”—those that reduce the 
number of people they send to prison by more than 50% of an 
established baseline—receive higher funding awards.62  The California 
Administrative Office of the Courts oversees county progress.63
n in December 2010,64 and the federal Edward Byrne Memorial 
Justice Assistance Grant program, provided through the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, seeded an initial funding pot of 
$45 million to be distributed among the fifty-eight counties.65 
Under S.B. 678, counties are required to spend their incentive funds 
to create community corrections practices and programs for adult felony 
probationers.66  Counties began to develop risks-and-needs assessments 
to determine the levels of supervision probationers required, and to 
e alternatives to incarceration such as electronic monitoring and 
evidence-based programs for rehabilitation services.67  Some counties 
also hired additional probation officers and created assessment strategies 
for probationers and pilot programs to expand evidence-based services.68 
In 2010, counties saw the rate of probation failures drop from 7.9% 
to 6.1%.69  That year, the counties diverted an average daily population 
of 6,000 felony probationers from going to prison, with no major impact 
on local crime, saving the State $179 million in reduced prison 
incarceration costs.70  These savings were used in part to fund the 
counties for the following year (fiscal year 2011-2012), dividing $87.5 
million among the counties.71  In 2011, again, probation failures dropped: 
probation departments diverted an estimated 9,500 people from state 
prison, and the rate of probation failure fell to 5.4%.72  The rate 
 
 61 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, SB678 YEAR 1 REPORT, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE ACT 2 (June 8, 2011), available 
www Year-1-Report-FINAL.pdf. 
re compared to a baseline established by 
verall county
. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3) . 
pdf. 
at .courts.ca.gov/documents/SB678-
 62 Id.  County annual probation revocation rates a
 averages from 2006 to 2008. o
 63 Warren, supra note 21, at 189. 
 64 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61. 
 65 Id. 
 66 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3) (Westlaw 2013). 
(A)–(D) (Westlaw 2013) 67 CAL
 68 Feinstein, supra note 38, at 406-07. 
 69 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 3. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id.; see also VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE FUNDING 
INITIATIVES, available at www.vera.org/files/pif-implementation-chart.
 72 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, SB 678 YEAR 2 REPORT, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES ACT OF 2009, at 2 (July 2012), 
available at www.courts.ca.gov/documents/SB678-Year-2-report.pdf. 
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r three years due to the reduction in probationers being sent to 
state prison.73  The Department of Finance calculated incentive grants by 
able to divert from 
prison by about $36,000—the average amount the State spent that year 
incar
 it was not having the 
imm
serving longer sentences for more significant crimes.   In addition to an 
increase in new felony offenders, jails also now hold many state parolees 
 
 
continued to decline in 2012, and that year the State distributed $136.3 
million to probation departments after it saved an estimated $536.6 
million ove
multiplying the number of prisoners the counties were 
cerating and supervising each person who had his or her probation 
revoked.74 
D.  AB 109: THE PRISON REALIGNMENT ACT OF 2011 
As the Supreme Court deliberated Brown v. Plata, California began 
preparing for a decision that would require rapid reduction in its prison 
population.75  While S.B. 678 was successful,
ediate effect on the prison population necessary for the State to meet 
the lower court’s decree that was under review by the Supreme Court.76  
By January 2011, Governor Brown had produced a draft of A.B. 109,77 
and counties began to hear whispers of what was to come: the transfer of 
thousands of state prisoners to county control.78 
One of realignment’s most dramatic features is that it requires 
people sentenced with low-level felonies to be held in county jails rather 
than state prisons.79  This means that jails see an increase of people 
80
 73 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., REPORT ON THE 
ALIFO
age daily population of approximately 9,500 people were 
iverte




ishable with death, by imprisonment in the state prison, or 
C RNIA COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES ACT OF 2009, FINDINGS FROM 
THE S.B. 678 PROGRAM 14 (Apr. 2013), available at www.courts.ca.gov/documents/lr-SB-678-
April-2013.pdf. 
 74 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 2. 
 75 Schlanger, supra note 15, at 184. 
 76 In 2011 under S.B. 678, an aver
d d from going to prison. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 73, at 12 n.35.  While 
impressive, this was not reducing the prison population was dramatically as necessary. 
 77 See generally LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, GOVERNOR’S REALIGNMENT PLAN—
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Jan. 25, 2011), available at www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2011/CJ_ 
Realignment_Plan_01_25_11.pdf. 
 78 See, e.g., Editorial, Get Ready,
2011, vailable at articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/30/realestate/la-ed-re-entry-20110830. 
 79 Felons who will be placed into county custody are those who are non-violent, non-serious, 
and non-sex offenders (also known as “the three nons”), based on the crimes that th
c tted, as defined by the Penal Code.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h) (Westlaw 2013); see also 
KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 2. 
 80 A “felony is a crime that is pun
notwithstanding any other provision of law, by imprisonment in a county jail under the provisions of 
subdivision (h) of [Penal Code] Section 1170.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (Westlaw 2013). 
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repo
ve sanctions such as work release or 
elect
run system called “Post-Release Community Supervision” (PRCS).   
 
 
who violated the terms of their release.81  Prior to realignment, people on 
state parole who violated the terms of their release, such as by failing to 
rt to a parole officer, would be sent back to prison.82  People on 
parole who committed new crimes would also be sent back to prison.83  
Now, most of these people, with few exceptions, are sent to county jail.84 
This has increased jail populations in some counties by hundreds of 
offenders per month.85  In order to manage this increasing population, 
realignment urges counties to use alternatives to incarceration such as 
flash incarceration, split sentences, electronic monitoring, and home 
detention.86  Sheriffs’ departments and sentencing judges have discretion 
as to whether low-level felons convicted in county court will be put in 
jail or released into mandatory supervision through split sentencing,87 
which can include alternati
ronic monitoring.88  Felons who remain under state parole return to 
the county of their last residence continuing to report to state officials 
and to utilize state funding.89 
Another major impact of A.B. 109 is that many state inmates who 
would have been released on parole under the supervision of state-funded 
parole officers and programming, are now released into a new county-
90
 81 State parolees supervised by either county or state agents will be sent to jail for parole 
voca
LIFORNIA RISONS ALENDAR EAR  1 (Mar. 2011), available at 
ORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, 
ww.c  information on how many people are 
re tions, except for individuals who were released from prison after serving indeterminate life 
sentences.  TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 8. 
 82 In 2010, the total number of adult prison parolees who returned to prison because of 
violating their release terms was 77,510.  DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., RATE OF FELON PAROLEES 
RETURNED TO CA P C Y 2010, at 1 tbl.
ww.cw dcr.ca.gov/reports_research/offender_information_services_branch/Annual/PVRET2/PVRET
2d2010.pdf. 
 83 Id.  In 2010, the total number of adult prison parolees who returned to prison because they 
ere cw onvicted of new crimes while on parole was 17,193. 
 84 These parolees will serve a revocation period of up to 180 days in county jail but will 
return to state parole or prison if they have remaining parole time.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000.08 
(Westlaw 2013). 
 85 See Public Safety Realignment, CAL. DEP’T C
dw dcr.ca.gov/realignment/index.html, for the most update
being transferred from state to county control. 
 86 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3454(b)-(c) (Westlaw 2012).  Split sentencing enables a judge to 
sentence a felon to both jail and community supervision.  Flash incarceration is a brief sentence in 
jail of up to ten days, used for felons who violate the terms of their community supervision.  
TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 60. 
 87 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(5)(B) (Westlaw 2012). 
 88 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.016(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
 89 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000.08 (Westlaw 2013). 
 90 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3451(a) (Westlaw 2013) (state inmates shall “upon release from 
prison and for a period not exceeding three years immediately following release, be subject to 
community supervision provided by a county agency designated by each county’s board of 
12
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 and training 
servi
n 
November 2012, increased income and sales taxes, in part to guarantee 
 
Specifically, any state prisoner who committed a low-level crime will be 
released into county control instead of being monitored by the State.91  
Every offender eligible for PRCS must enter into a PRCS agreement as a 
condition of his or her release from prison.92  Each county’s PRCS 
system is in charge of supervising and providing rehabilitative 
programming.93  Adult probation departments are now authorized to 
connect this population with housing, rehabilitation,
ces.94  Altogether, realignment envisions a dramatic transformation 
in how probation departments handle their populations.95 
Realignment initially provided approximately $450 million to be 
divided among the counties in fiscal year 2011-12 to implement 
realignment strategies.96  In fiscal year 2012-2013, this increased to $850 
million, and for fiscal year 2013-2014 the State allocated more than $1 
billion to the counties.97  Proposition 30, which voters passed i
funding for realignment.98 
 
supervisors which is consistent with evidence-based practices, including, but not limited to, 
supervision policies, procedures, programs, and practices demonstrated by scientific research to 
reduce recidivism among individuals under postrelease supervision.”). 
 91 This group will not include anyone in state prison currently serving a term for a violent 
offense, who has committed a third strike pursuant to California’s “Three Strikes, You’re Out” law, 
or who is considered a Mentally Disordered Offender.  See KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 3.  
Note, however, that this threshold only takes into account the offender’s most recent crime.  An 
offender who committed a violent crime in the past and, for example, is back in prison due to a 
technical violation of parole will still be considered eligible for PRCS.  A PRCS offender is eligible 
Westlaw 2012). 
law 2012). 
d in this Comment should be offered to 
icized A.B. 109 for what they call a fiscally penalizing policy of 
wardi
ing of Realignment, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, available at 
ww.c
for discharge at six months. 
 92 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3452 (
 93 KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 3. 
 94 CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(8) (West
 95 To be clear, the reentry services that are discusse
both the PRCS population and those “three non” felons who are now released into mandatory 
supervision under A.B. 109. 
 96 Some counties crit
a ng less realignment funding to counties that have fewer people in state prison.  Counties 
received more money if the State estimated that more parolees would be returned to them.  
Therefore, counties that had already succeeded in diverting people from prison (and were therefore 
most likely already getting more S.B. 678 funding), or that had lower crime rates, received less start-
up funding for A.B. 109.  This funding rubric has since been revised. Petersilia & Snyder, supra note 
20, at 272-73. 
 97 Fund
w dcr.ca.gov/realignment/Funding-Realignment.html (last visited May 22, 2013). 
 98 Petersilia & Snyder, supra note 20, at 8-9. 
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ss.  For example, in a memo to counties, Paul 
McIntosh, Executive Director of the California State Association of 
ment 
will in our public safety 
communities.  The successful model will not be an incarceration model, 
but o
Anthony Kennedy, observed that the State’s 
California who “are at risk so long as the State continues to provide 
inadequate care.”103  Not only did the Court conclude that reducing 
 
 
II.  AB 109 AND PLATA CALL ON COUNTIES TO VASTLY ALTER THE 
ROLE OF PROBATION, TO SLOW RECIDIVISM, AND TO IMPROVE 
REHABILITATION 
Both realignment measures and Plata call on counties to focus on 
recidivism, so much so that many officials have come away with the 
impression that reentry and rehabilitation services are necessary for 
realignment’s succe
Counties, stated: “Clearly the successful implementation of realign
 require a significant paradigm shift 
ne that seeks to divert and rehabilitate citizens, returning them to be 
productive members of our community.”99  This impression stems from 
explicit language about rehabilitation and reentry programs in 
realignment’s legislative language, as well as from the Supreme Court’s 
discussion in Brown v. Plata.100  Indeed, both the Supreme Court and the 
state legislation highlight holistic remedies to prison population 
reduction that focus more on the means—systemic reform of probation—
than on the ends.101 
A.  THE SUPREME COURT’S BROAD REMEDY INCLUDED REDUCING 
RECIDIVISM THROUGH REENTRY SERVICES 
The Supreme Court laid the groundwork for California to refocus its 
corrections system on reducing recidivism through rehabilitation.  The 
opinion, authored by Justice 
prison system as a whole is troubled, going so far as to say that all 
incarcerated persons are the system’s “next potential victims.”102  In 
assigning a remedy as broad as reducing the population of the State’s 
prison system, the Court created an order that will impact all prisoners in 
 99 Memorandum from Paul McIntosh, Exec. Dir., Cal. State Ass’n of Counties, to County 
uper
AL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(4)-(5) (Westlaw 2012); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 
 
nges on the assumption that prison officials will provide better care if there are 
wer s.  Id. 
S visors and County Administrative Officers (July 12, 2011). 
 100 See, e.g., C
1910, 1943 (2011). 
 101 CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(4)-(5) (Westlaw 2012). 
 102 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1940.  In fact, as the Court acknowledged, reducing the prison 
population does not directly relate to creating a better care system for offenders.  The reasoning 
behind the remedy hi
fe prisoner
 103 Id. 
14
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n considering 
popu
is language demonstrates the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
California needs to utilize alternatives to incarceration, including 
tion 
order to be safe and feasible.  Had the Court’s remedy mandated 




overcrowding was a narrow enough remedy to pass constitutional 
muster,104 but it also celebrated the option as a means of addressing other 
systemic problems: “Reducing overcrowding will also have positive 
effects beyond facilitating timely and adequate access to medical care, 
including reducing the incidence of prison violence and ameliorating 
unsafe living conditions.”105 
 After establishing that a population reduction was the only option 
for the State, and that the remedy could affect the prison population in its 
entirety, Justice Kennedy elaborated on the alternative remedies that 
would reduce the population of prisoners without impacting public 
safety.106  Under the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act, a court must 
give substantial weight to public safety concerns whe
lation reduction orders.107  The district court accepted the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the State could reduce its prison population while 
maintaining public safety through such means as using community 
correctional programs and rehabilitative programming, and the Supreme 
Court accepted these findings as fact.108  Justice Kennedy took note of 
the incarceration alternatives the district court had discussed, specifically 
that the State could employ methods such as “[d]iverting low-risk 
offenders to community programs such as drug treatment, day reporting 
centers, and electronic monitoring,” as well as “punishing technical 
parole violations through community-based programs.”109 
Th
community-based programming, in order for a population reduc
es of overpopulation, it would have appeared both unrealistic and 
flippant—a call to release thousands of prisoners without a system to 
help them reenter mainstream society.  However, the Court made 
alternatives to incarceration a component of its remedy by recognizing 
 104 Id. at 1929. 
 105 Id. at 1939. 
 106 Id. at 1942-43. 
 107 18 U.S.C.A § 3626(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw 2013). 
ions through community-
s.  This last measure would be particularly beneficial as it would reduce crowding in 
 108 Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954 (J. Scalia, dissenting).  Justice Scalia took particular issue 
with this in his dissent. 
 109 Id. at 1943 (majority opinion).  Specifically, the Court stated that the “State now sends 
large numbers of persons to prison for violating a technical term or condition of their parole, and it 
could reduce the prison population by punishing technical parole violat
based program
the reception centers, which are especially hard hit by overcrowding.”  Id. 
15
Flynn: Putting Teeth into A.B. 109
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013




mental health treatment.  It also provides explicit examples of programs 
practices to the PRCS population that encompass “a range of custodial 
and noncustodial responses to criminal or noncompliant offender 
 
that without such measures, its mandate could lead to a public safety 
risk.110 
B.  REALIGNMENT’S FOCUS ON REHABILITATION’S ROLE IN ENDING 
RECIDIVISM 
Realignment expanded on the Court’s concept of creating holistic 
and wide-ranging solutions.  The language of A.B. 109’s modifying bill, 
A.B. 117, focuses on ending recidivism largely through community-
based corrections programs.111  The legislation explicitly declares that 
California “must reinvest its criminal justice resources to support 
community-based corrections programs and evidence-based practices” in 
order to best address public safety issues.112 
A.B. 117 seeks to mitigate public safety risks by tasking counties 
with creating programs that facilitate low-level felony offenders’ 
“reintegration back into society.”113  The legislation states that f
 be utilized to provide more intensive probation supervision and 
expand the availability of evidence-based rehabilitation programs 
“including, but not limited to, drug and alcohol treatment, mental health 
treatment, anger management, cognitive behavior programs, and job 
training and employment services”114 and “evaluating the effectiveness 
of rehabilitation and supervision programs and ensuring program 
fidelity.”115  It includes several suggestions for more holistic treatment 
strategies, such as community-based residential programs that offer drug 
and alcohol treatment, literacy training, employment counseling, and
such as mother-infant care programs and day reporting centers.116 
By strongly encouraging counties to apply recidivism-reducing 
 
 110 Id. 
 111 A.B. 117, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011-2012), amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 
17.5 (Westlaw 2012). 
 112 CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(4) (Westlaw 2012). 
ealigning low-level felony offenders 
 offenses to locally run community-
community-based punishment, 
enhanced secured capacity, will 
pro
 113 CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(5) (Westlaw 2012) (“R
who do not have prior convictions for serious, violent, or sex
based corrections programs, which are strengthened through 
, and evidence-based practices, improved supervision strategies
im ve public safety outcomes among adult felons and facilitate their reintegration back into 
society.”). 
 114 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3)(D) (Westlaw 2012). 
 115 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3)(E) (Westlaw 2012). 
 116 CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(8)(H)-(K) (Westlaw 2012). 
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acti  to 
man s—as well as the large population that 




spe irements, realignment 




vity,”117 the Legislature has demonstrated that it expects counties
age their PRCS population
 stems the flow of people back into jails and addresses public safety 
issues.  Otherwise, the county jails will suffer the same fate as the State’s 
prisons: overpopulation and the potential violation of inmates’ rights.118 
III.  WITHOUT REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTIES’ REHABILITATION 
EFFORTS, COUNTIES WILL NOT ESTABLISH THE TYPE OF PROBATION 
SERVICES NEEDED TO FULFILL THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATION 
AND THE SUPREME COURT 
By relying on counties to develop post-release rehabilitation
tems for those on mandatory supervision or in PRCS with
cifying funding and program-development requ
 types of programs, if any, to provide, counties are responding to 
realignment in very different ways, with many choosing to forgo 
investing in substantial reentry services, which, as will be demonstrated 
below, are a primary tool in reducing recidivism.119 
A.  REALIGNMENT PROVIDES MINIMAL GUIDANCE FOR HOW COUNTIES 
SHOULD FACILITATE REENTRY AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, 
WHICH ARE VITAL TO REDUCING RECIDIVISM 
The State provided minimal specifications for how counties should 
spend funding apportionments.120  These specifications came in two 
forms: specific funding accounts earmarked for particular entities, and a 
list of suggested programs counties could incorporate into their probation 
departments.121  The initial funding for counties’ first year of realignment 
 117 CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(8) (Westlaw 2012). 
ing.  The Prison Law Office recently filed a suit 
 prisoners.  Additionally, many 
 9-10. 
id. for a breakdown of the total realignment package. 
 e.g., EXEC. COMM. OF THE SANTA CRUZ CNTY. CMTY. CORR. P’SHIP, SANTA CRUZ 
OUN
 118 Jails are already grappling with overcrowd
against Fresno County for failing to provide mental health care to
jails are under court-enforced population caps.  See Schlanger, supra note 15, at 212-213 for a 
thorough discussion of realignment’s impact on jail populations.  See also MISCZYNSKI, supra note 
4, at 13 (“[C]ounties are clearly not in a position to both incarcerate all of the inmates they managed 
prior to realignment and all of the realigned offenders.”). 
 119 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 19, at
 120 See 
 121 See,
C TY PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND POST RELEASE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 2011 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 6 (Oct. 4, 2011), available at www.calrealignment.org/component/ 
docman/doc_download/69-santa-cruz-county-plan.html?Itemid, for an example of how counties 
received their initial state funding allotment. 
17
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natives to 
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yment assistance and anger 
 
was distributed by the State in four separate accounts.122  One funding 
stream was allocated for purposes that included increasing the number of 
jail beds, hiring additional jail security, creating alter
ceration, such as increased use of electronic monitoring supplies and 
probation officers, and channeling more resources into existing and new 
rehabilitation programs.123  The three other streams of funding were 
reserved for the district attorney and public defenders’ offices, one-time 
start-up costs, and planning grants.124  Therefore, while the State 
indicated to counties that some funds were indeed intended to go toward 
rehabilitative and reentry services, it did not specify a particular spending 
rubric, and thus counties could elect to spend the majority of PRCS 
program funds on augmenting their incarceration facilities.125 
Reentry and rehabilitative programs have proven to be highly 
effective tools for reducing recidivism.  The Legislative Analyst’s Office 
(LAO) highlighted that in order to minimize recidivism and reduce 
crime, offenders require treatment and assistance programs “such as drug 
treatment, mental health counseling, emplo
management.”126  Research has shown that offenders in community 
supervision are more likely to be successful while on probation if they 
are provided effective, evidence-based  treatment and assistance 127
programs (i.e., those that are continually monitored and have a proven 
record of success).128  Not only are these programs better for 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Memorandum from Paul McIntosh, CSAC Exec. Dir., on Allocation/Caseload Information 
on AB 109/AB117 (Criminal Justice Realignment), to Chairs, Cnty. Bds. of Supervisors, Cnty. 
Admin. Officers 1 (July 8, 2011), available at www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhda%20files/ 
committees/forensics/1107_forensics/csac_memo_re_allocation-caseload_info_on_ab_109_(7-8-
11).pdf. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See generally LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12. 
 127 One study found that “[t]he implementation of evidence-based practices results in an 
average decrease in future crime of between 10 percent and 20 percent, whereas programs that are 
not evidence-based tend to see no decrease and even a slight increase in future crime.  Interventions 
that follow all evidence-based practices can achieve recidivism reductions of 30 percent.  Many state 
statutes and administrative regulations specify that certain correctional services and programs must 
be evidence-based.”  PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, POLICY 
FRAMEWORK TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS ch. 1, at 6 (Dec. 15, 2008), available at 
www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/PolicyFra
ewom rk.pdf (footnotes omitted). 
 128 JOHN ROMAN & AARON CHALFIN, JUSTICE POLICY CTR., DOES IT PAY TO INVEST IN 
REENTRY PROGRAMS FOR JAIL INMATES? 1 (June 2006), available at www.urban.org/ 
projects/reentry-roundtable/upload/roman_chalfin.pdf (finding “that reentry programs for jail-based 
inmates produce benefits large enough to offset the cost of the investment with only a modest 
reduction in crime”).  In an effort to contain the scope of this Comment, data and studies on the vast 
18
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probationers, but they can also be less expensive than incarceration.129  
Moreover, better probation practices can improve public safety by 
providing people exiting jail with opportunities and healing that decrease 
their motivation to commit future crimes.130 
Realignment modifies the Penal Code to provide suggestions for 




onents of rehabilitation efforts by counties mandatory.131  Instead, it 
only suggests rehabilitation and reentry programming possibilities.132  
For example, A.B. 117 merely suggests that the community-based 
punishment (which includes reentry services) “may be provided by local 
public safety entities directly or through community-based public or 
private correctional service providers.”133 
A.B. 117 modifies another section of the Penal Code to mandate 
that funds “shall be used to provide supervision and rehabilitative 
services for adult felony offenders subject to probation, and shall be 
spent on evidence-based community corrections practices and 
programs.”134  While the use of “shall” indicates that counties are 
required to spend at least some funding on community programs, the 
legislation then states that the programs “may” include expanding 
evidence-based risk and needs assessments, electronic monitoring, 
mandatory community service, home detention, day reporting, restorative 
justice programs, work furlough programs, and incarceration in county 
jail for up to ninety days.135  The Legislature left out any addition
ance that would guarantee that counties focus more on treatment 
than on monitoring.  The reentry services that A.B. 117 lists—such as 
job training programs, employment services, and alcohol treatment—are 
all purely suggestive, and the law does not provide counties with 
 
benefit of rehabilitative and reentry programs for people exiting incarceration will be omitted.  For 
further reading on this issue, see Joan Petersilia, What Works in Prisoner Reentry—Reviewing and 
Questioning the Evidence, 68 FED. PROBATION 4 (2004), and JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME 
BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF PRISONER REENTRY (2005). 
 129 Petersilia, supra note 128, at 7. 
 130 BILL ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, SB 678 2 (June 16, 2009), available 
at www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb_678_cfa_20090619_104915_asm_co 
mm.html.  A.B. 117 states that public safety will be improved by “[r]ealigning low-level felony 
fend  violent, or sex offenses to locally run 
mm tating an incarcerated person’s 
reintegration back into society.”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(5) (Westlaw 2012). 
30(b)(3) (Westlaw 2012) (emphasis added). 
of ers who do not have prior convictions for serious,
co unity-based corrections programs,” essentially by better facili
“
 131 See generally KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6. 
 132 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(8) (Westlaw 2012). 
 133 Id. (emphasis added). 
 134 CAL. PENAL CODE § 12
 135 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3)(A)-(B) (Westlaw 2012). 
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minimal requirements, performance measurements, or  accountability 
models to ensure these techniques are being implemented properly.136 
Much like as in the California Probation Subsidy Act of 1965 and 
S.B. 678, none of these suggested programming efforts are enforceable 
s legislation 
by n 
new offenders and to create a new probationary system.138  S.B. 678 
required funds to be spent on community practices and programs, but it 
did n
In 2007, prior to any 
of th
In part, this is an effort to relieve strapped probation departments: a study 
by the LAO showed that probation officers frequently recommend that 
repeat probation violators be sent to prison because probation 
cient resources to properly supervise and 
requirements.137  But realignment goes further than previou
making mandatory sentencing changes and forcing counties to take o
ot mandate that counties keep felons in their control.  A.B. 109, on 
the other hand, mandates that counties retain a large portion of felons, 
but it does not put detailed requirements on how counties spend their 
funds.  While the previous legislations used the “carrot” of funding 
incentives to encourage counties to participate in programming, 
realignment only provides a “stick,” with dangerous ramifications if 
counties are unsuccessful at keeping PRCS and probation populations 
from returning to jail. 
B.  MANY COUNTIES’ PROBATIONARY SYSTEMS LACK THE 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE MOTIVATION NEEDED TO CREATE THE 
NECESSARY REHABILITATIVE SERVICES 
California has some of the worst probation failure rates in the 
country—probationers are 10% less likely than the national average to 
successfully complete their probationary periods.139  
e current probation reform acts, around 20,000 of the nearly 47,000 
new admissions to state prison were felony offenders who were 
committed to state prison after failing probation supervision.140  Some 
counties return probationers to prison at a rate as high as 12% to 16%.141  
departments “often lack suffi
 
 136 For a discussion of performance measurements and accountability recommendations, see 
TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 16-17. 
 137 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3) (Westlaw 2012). 
 138 See generally KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6. 
 139 Warren, supra note 21, at 187. 
 140 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 130. 
 141 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12, at 30-31. 
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 to prison.  
Realignment sought to end this cycle of recidivism by decreasing 
 systems.145  
Ho ant 
tha ounties do not have substantial reentry systems already in 
place.146  Moreover, a look at county realignment plans demonstrates that 
coun
 
treat” repeat offenders.142  The study found that “[t]he consequence of 
these fiscal incentives is that some offenders who could be safely and 
successfully supervised at the local level . . . are instead sent to state 
prison at an even greater cost to taxpayers.”143  Essentially, counties pass 
the buck to the State by sending people 144
parole violations and repeat offenses through better reentry
wever, the lack of existing infrastructure and political will has me
t many c
ties often do not have the motivation to use realignment funding in a 
way that will establish these services.  While some counties have focused 
efforts on programs to reduce probation failure rates, other counties have 
focused primarily on incarceration.147 
1.  Many Communities and Probation Departments Lack the 
Infrastructure and Political Will To Create the Necessary Reentry 
Systems 
Probation departments have long lacked the resources needed to 
create significant reentry systems.148  Only 3,000 sworn probation 
officers monitor the estimated 330,000 adult probationers statewide.149  
Each probation officer oversees between one hundred and two hundred 
cases a month.150  Two propositions in the 1970s severely limited 
 
 142 Id. at 19.  The LAO estimated that about 3,000 probation officers in the state manage 100-
200 cases each, which entails ensuring that probationers meet the terms of the release and often 
involves referring probationers to service programs.  See generally id. at 3, 8-9. 
 143 Id. at 19. 
 at 377 (“This dearth of funds for adult 
roba  resources creates an incentive structure adverse to 




E ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12, at 10. 
 144 Id. at 20; see also Feinstein, supra note 38,
p tion and the inadequate supervision and
keeping probationers in the community.  Pr
incarceration rather than probation since the state must then bear the financial burden of that 
offender; moreover, sending a probationer to prison is one less case for their already overburdened 
loads.  Judges are incentivized to revoke probation and sentence someone to state prison for the 
same reason.”). 
 145 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(1)-(8) (Westlaw 2
 146 See generally Warren, supra note 21. 
 147 See TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 9-10. 
 148 See generally Warren, supra note 21. 
 149 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12, at 20; PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE 
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1980s and 1990s, the focus of 
prob
nt to support reentry programs,  and 
alrea
Probation Department is hoping to build a second Day Reporting Center 
 
 
counties’ tax revenues, and since then “adult probation services in 
California have been woefully underfunded.”151  Even with S.B. 678 
funding, many county probation departments struggle to provide 
rehabilitative programming to their pre-realignment populations.152 
Moreover, the idea that probation should provide rehabilitative 
services came back into vogue only recently.153  While the concept of 
reforming people convicted of crimes was popular in the era of the 
Probation Subsidy Act of 1965, by the 
ation turned to punishment.154  A 1995 study found that only 8% of 
probation departments in the state prioritized rehabilitation and social 
reintegration, whereas 75% of the departments prioritized enforcing the 
terms of probation.155  More recently, the LAO conducted a study of 
thirty-one counties and found that probation departments often do not 
make programming available that is proven to help people on probation 
succeed in mainstream society post-conviction and incarceration.156  The 
survey found that while some programs, such as substance abuse 
treatment and mental illness programs, were ubiquitous, other programs, 
such as those regarding education, housing, and vocational training, were 
offered only rarely.157  Even in counties that have programs already 
available, other factors, such as limited capacity and low quality, kept 
many probationers from participating.158 
Communities are often relucta 159
dy some localities have attempted to put the brakes on probation 
departments’ plans to increase community programming or to build new 
day centers for PRCS populations.  In San Bernardino County, the 
 151 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 21, at 186 (“Due to the absence of state funding, as well as 
 services in California have been 
d for at least thirty years.”). 
IN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 73, at 29; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
OUR
an Kurlychek, What Is My Left Hand Doing? The Need for Unifying 
urpos Policy in the Criminal Justice System, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 909, 914 
alyzing Montana’s early release program, Kurlychek notes that “[f]ear of the offender 
an om fiction into fact through the enactment of policies that serve to ‘protect’ the 
ublic
the devastating impact of Propositions 4 and 13, adult probation
woefully underfunde
 152 ADM
C TS & CAL. STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES, PROBATION SERVICES TASK. FORCE FINAL REPORT 1 
(2003), available at www.courts.ca.gov/documents/fullReport.pdf. 
 153 Warren, supra note 21, at 188. 
 154 Id. at 187. 
 155 NIETO, supra note 5, at 18-19. 
 156 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12, at 19. 
 157 Id. at 17. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See, e.g., Meg
P e and 
(2011).  In an
is tr sformed fr
p  by restricting opportunities for those with a criminal record.  Restrictions range from housing 
and employment to qualifying for student loans and even the right to vote.” Id. 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss3/7
2013] Putting Teeth into A.B. 109 547 
 housing.   With 
hous
n 
acknowledged this, it devoted no funding to the creation of new stable 
 
 
in the city of Victorville to provide its PRCS population with services.160  
The Victorville Planning Commission rejected these plans, on the ground 
that it did not want probationers to be brought into the downtown area.161  
The Commission’s report said the center would continue the expansion 
of “less desirable social services in [the] vicinity of the Civic Center.”162  
The county Probation Department said that without the facility, several 
hundred of its PRCS members would not get rehabilitation or reentry 
services.163  The City Council upheld the Planning Commission’s 
decision by a three-to-one vote.164 
The barriers to developing better reentry programs are well 
illustrated by the difficulty in supplying housing to probationers.  An 
estimated 10% of parolees are homeless, with the number rising to 
between 30% and 50% in cities like San Francisco and Los Angeles.165  
Studies show that a formerly incarcerated person who is released into a 
homeless shelter is 7% more likely to abscond from parole after his or 
her first month out than a person who has stable 166
ing such as shelters, temporary housing, and permanent supportive 
housing already at capacity, counties have limited resources to house this 
new population, and there is little political will to build more housing for 
a relatively unsympathetic group—the probationers.167  In San Joaquin 
County, for instance, 20% of PRCS members were estimated to be 
returning to the county homeless.168  While the county’s pla
 160 Beatriz E. Valenzuela, City, County Butt Heads over Expanding Probation Services, 
DAILY PRESS, Feb. 18, 2012, available at http://www.vvdailypress.com/articles/city-32947-
victorville-county.html. 
 161 Id. 





 the difficulty of 
ple reentry housing because of neighborhood opposition). 
F THE CMTY. CORR. P’SHIP, SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY 
UBLI
 163 Id. 
 164 Beatriz E. Valenzuela, Victorville Denies Probation Expansion Appeal, DAILY PRESS, 
Apr. 4, 2012, availa
appeal.html. 
 165 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, HOMELESSNESS AND PRISONER RE-ENTRY, available at 
www.reentrypolicy.org/jc_publications/homelessness_prisoner_reentry/Hom
visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 166 MARTA NELSON, PERRY DEESS & HARLOTTE ALL N, VERA IN T. OF JUSTICE, THE FIRST 
MONTH OUT: POST-INCARCERATION EXPERIENCES IN NEW YORK CITY 9 (Sept. 1999), available at 
www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/first_month_ou
 167 See generally THE FORTUNE SOC’Y, IN OUR BACKYARD: OVERCOMING COMMUNITY 
RESISTANCE TO REENTRY HOUSING (A NIMBY TOOLKIT) (2011), available at 
http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/TOOL_KIT_1-NIMBY_FINAL.pdf (discussing
im menting 
 168 SAN JOAQUIN CNTY. EXEC. COMM. O
P C SAFETY REALIGNMENT 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 39 (Aug. 17, 2011), available at 
www.calrealignment.org/county-implementation/list-of-county-plans.html. 
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d 
ins  State to the 




sentenced 178 people to jail who otherwise would have been sent to 
prison.174  The county has long been progressive in its probation 
 
housing.169  Many counties did not plan to fund any reentry housing an
tead allocated much of their state funding from the
170
U found that the largest twenty-five counties in the state had spent 
more than $45 million on expanding jail capacity.171 
Without additional funding for increasing these services in the 
community, these programs will not be able to meet the responsibility of 
providing for the new PRCS population or to keep this population fro
mmitting crimes and returning to prison.  Forcing counties to spend 
realignment funding on these programs is the only way to guarantee that 
these services will be available to the PRCS and probation populations. 
2.  Initial Realignment Plans Demonstrate that Probation Departments 
Are Not Implementing Sufficient Reentry Programming 
There is tremendous disparity in how counties have allocated their 
realignment funding and efforts.172  A look at the initial realignment 
plans created by counties demonstrates how counties have differed in 
their responses to the minimal requirements of the new PRCS system, 
with many focusing on jail expansion instead of providing services.173 
For a positive example, in the first year of realignment San 
Francisco County received 411 prisoners into its PRCS population, and 
strategies.175  It established a Reentry Council in 2005, which initiated 
 
 169 Id. 
 170 HOPPER ET AL., supra note 10, at 15. 
 171 Id., The ACLU concluded that “[c]ounties have chosen a path of jail expansion,” finding 
that twenty-five of the state’s largest counties are expanding jail capacity by more than 7000 beds, as 
well as expanding corrections staff. 
s.  See also CURB 
ited for 
 Resp
ORR. P’SHIP EXEC. COMM., PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT IN SAN FRANCISCO: 
HE F
milar size.  It was already a top-
 172 See CALREALIGNMENT.ORG for access to the majority of county plan
Realignment Report Card—Second Edition, CALIFORNIANS UNITED FOR A RESPONSIBLE BUDGET, 
www.curbprisonspending.org/?p=1391#_edn30 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).  Californians Un
a onsible Budget (CURB), a coalition of forty organizations, created its own county report card 
on how counties are utilizing alternatives to incarceration.  The report card compares the amount of 
funding counties are spending on community-based reentry services to the amount that counties are 
spending on new jail beds (primarily through state funding from A.B. 900, which authorized $7.4 
billion in lease revenue bonds to be used for the expansion of prison, reentry centers and jails). See 
id. 
 173 See CALREALIGNMENT.ORG for access to the majority of county plans. 
 174 CMTY. C
T IRST 12 MONTHS 8 (Dec. 19, 2012), available at www.sfsheriffs.net/files/SF_PSR.pdf. 
 175 In fact, this is one reason why San Francisco County has seen fewer people entering into 
its PRCS system.  Since its existing prison deterrent systems were developed prior to realignment, 
the County had fewer people in state prison than other counties of si
24
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ositions in the county justice system to help 
coor
e “improving public safety by reducing recidivism; 
impr
 
efforts to bring probationers together with local community programs as 
well as to create new programs to help probationers enter into the 
mainstream.176 San Francisco’s initial realignment plan focused on 
creating a network of p
dinate and connect the PRCS and probation population, including 
augmenting the county’s Reentry Unit in its Public Defender’s Office, 
which is in charge of connecting probationers with services in the 
community.177  It also called for creating a “Reentry Division and Pre-
Release Team”178 to create alternative custody options and for 
establishing a “Care Coordination” entity to assist probationers in 
navigating the county healthcare systems.179  The plan highlighted the 
need to create stable housing, employment help and treatment for those 
exiting incarceration.180 
Santa Cruz County provides another example of a plan rich with 
rehabilitation and reentry strategies.  Its thirty-three-page plan spent 
considerable space explaining its emphasis on creating and using 
evidence-based practices, and on how to continue funding its dozen 
existing reentry programs.181  The plan explained that its “[f]our key 
values” includ
oving accountability to taxpayers by providing cost-effective 
solutions; protecting the County from costly legal liability related to jail 
overcrowding; and reducing structural inequalities based on race and 
poverty.”182  Despite the fact that Santa Cruz County jails were at 125% 
capacity when realignment began,183 it dedicated the entirety of its 
PRCS/incarceration funds to creating a strong probation department, 
with no funds put toward building new jail beds.184  In the first six 
 
tier county under S.B. 678, in recognition of its success in retaining offenders within its local system. 
EXEC. COMM. OF THE CMTY. CORR. P’SHIP, CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC SAFETY 
REALIGNMENT & POST RELEASE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 7 (July 
21, 2011), available at www.sfgov3.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=1035. 
(“Collaborative case planning is the focal point of this active engagement 
 multiple 
ervic e.g  employm  vo aining, education,
utriti behavioral health, and pro-social activities).”). 
 
181
 176 Id. at 5. 
 177 Id. at 16 
approach involving the offender, his/her family, probation officer, law enforcement and
. housing, ent, cational tr  physical health, s e providers (
n onal supports, 
 178 Id. at 17-18.
 179 Id. at 20. 
 180 Id. at 15. 
  EXEC. COMM. OF THE SANTA CRUZ CNTY. CMTY. CORR. P’SHIP, supra note 121. 
 182 Id. at 15. 
 183 Id. at 26. 
 184 Id. at 15. 
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% increase in its offender 
popu
 
months of realignment, Santa Cruz County saw a 20% decrease in its jail 
population.185
Other counties were more circumspect about their reentry programs.  
Many counties with smaller populations created essentially boilerplate 
plans that contained only the language suggested by the CDRC and 
nothing else.  For example, Siskiyou County, which expected to have a 
PRCS population of only twenty-three, created a plan that was just seven 
pages long and contained little more than a summary of the changes 
realignment will make across the state, a list of people who would make 
up its Community Corrections Partnership Executive Committee, and a 
basic structure for the creation of future plans.186  Napa County, which 
also has a small population but expected a 25
lation at the start of realignment, created a ten-page plan similar in 
scope.187  Neither Siskiyou County’s nor Napa County’s plan provided 
more than a brief nod to reentry programs or recidivism-reducing 
strategies. 
Meanwhile, some larger county plans were focused more on 
increasing their number of jail beds than on augmenting their reentry 
systems.  Kern County, for example, expected its average daily 
population of offenders to increase by about two thousand under 
realignment.188  While its lengthy plan discussed the benefits of its 
already-existing Day Reporting Center, where probationers can receive 
mental health and substance abuse treatment, by far the bulk of the 
county’s funding allotment was allocated to ensuring that the PRCS 
population will be assessed for risk and well-monitored, and to adding 
jail beds to accommodate 236 more people.189 
 
 185 CURB Realignment Report Card—Second Edition, supra note 172. 
nent/docman/doc_download/86-siskiyou-countyplan.html?Itemid. 
. at 11.  The variety of structure and scope among these plans in some ways is 
CS populations will be 
 Some counties need to initially focus on building and training their 
roba d practices in reentry 
ystem
 186 SISKIYOU COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND POST RELEASE COMMUNITY 
SUPERVISION PRELIMINARY PLAN (Oct. 11, 2011), available at www.calrealignment.org/ 
compo
 187 See COUNTY OF NAPA PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND POST RELEASE COMMUNITY 
SUPERVISION 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2011), available at www.calrealignment.org/ 
component/docman/doc_download/74-napa-county-plan.html?Itemid. 
 188 COUNTY OF KERN PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT ACT OF 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 4 
(2011), available at http://www.calrealignment.org/county-implementation/list-of-county-plans. 
html. 
 189 Id
understandable in that it reflects the population needs each county is expecting to confront within 
this new system.  For example, both Riverside and San Joaquin counties dedicate substantial funding 
toward their mental health departments, in response to indications that the PR
returning with mental disorders. 
p tion departments to bring them up to date with current evidence-base
s s. 
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ould have substance-abuse 
issue
of funding was allocated to programs and services provided by other 
agencies in the community, “such as substance abuse and mental health 





Riverside County had more than 2,000 people released into its 
PRCS population in its first year.  Initially, the county received a total of 
nearly $23 million in realignment funding from the State for fiscal year 
2011-2012, and the county allocated $5.8 million of its realignment 
funding to its probation department while giving more than $10 million 
to its Sheriff’s Department.190  While the plan mentioned that the county 
was interested in building Day Reporting Centers, it provided few 
details, while many pages of the plan were devoted to inmate 
monitoring.191  The plan allotted $4.2 million of realignment funding to 
go toward the county’s Department of Mental Health, and the county 
estimated that 80% of its PRCS population w
s and 5% would have severe mental-health problems.192  Relative to 
San Francisco and Santa Cruz counties, both Kern and Riverside 
counties initially focused funding heavily on incarceration.193 
The LAO surveyed forty-seven county plans and found that 32% of 
funding in most counties went to probation departments, “primarily for 
supervision and programs.”194  While this may sound like counties are 
taking heed of the need to develop reentry and rehabilitative programs, it 
is unclear how much of this funding has actually been spent on reentry 
programs.  More telling is that the LAO study also found that only 11% 
t ent, housing assistance a
counties did not have strong probation systems already in place when 
realignment began, the fact that so little is being spent on augmenting the 
pacity of outside agencies indicates that these resources might not b






f the thirteen counties it reviewed spent more money on jail 
rs, as collaborative and evidence-based one-stop delivery sites” to serve 50 
su
t allocates a 
190 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT & POST-RELEASE COMMUNIT
PERVISION FINAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 43 (Feb. 7, 2012), available at www.probation.c
rside.ca.us/pdf/ccpec/Final_Implementation_Plan_February_7_2012.pdf. 
191 Id. at 7. 
192 CURB Realignment Report Card—Second Edition, supra note 172. 
193  Id.  CURB found that nine o
expansion than on alternatives. 
 194 TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 9-10. 
 195 Id. at 10. 
 196 The ACLU’s report has additional data on how little some counties are putting toward 
reentry programming: 
[T]he Probation Department in Orange County plans to open “several regional adult day 
reporting cente
pervisees each, but the plan allocates only nine percent of the programming budget to 
contract with service providers, or one-sixth that of the sheriff’s allocation.  Kings County’s 
plan acknowledges that “live in drug treatment programs will be essential to help reduce 
overcrowding in the jail” and that mental health staffing must be increased, bu
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d 
discussion about the rehabilitative needs of the county’s PRCS 
 
counties the needed push to put more resources into reentry programs 
and 
 
In the last year, even without requirements, many counties have 
been allocating more resources to reintegrating inmates than they had 
before.197  For example, in March 2013 Riverside County released an 
update to its plan.198  For fiscal year 2012-2013, the State awarded 
Riverside with more than $43 million, and, combined with additional 
funding, the county had $53 million to spend on its realignment 
measures.199  While it spent $21 million on the Sheriff’s Department and 
just half that on probation, it also allocated $10 million to the county’s 
Department of Mental Health to go toward services like substance abuse 
programs and housing.200  The updated plan included more detaile
population.201  However, making these programs a requirement will give
cut through resistance in the community and probation department, 
and ensure that all counties respond similarly.  By creating mandates for 
how counties should allocate funding to their PRCS populations, as well 
as the populations of people who will be heading into county-sentenced 
probation, the Legislature could remedy disparities among counties and 
make realignment much more likely to succeed in reducing recidivism. 
 
paltry two percent of its total AB 109 programming budget to health, treatment, and other 
services—less than the allocations made to both the Human Resources and the County 
Counsel.  This is in stark contrast to counties like Alameda, Placer, San Joaquin, Santa Clara, 
Shasta, and Solano, which allocate anywhere from a quarter to a third to such programming. 
 HOPPER ET AL., supra note 10, at 40. 
 197 Local newspapers regularly come out with stories about how counties are attempting new 
programs for their reentry population.  For example, both the tiny counties of Glenn County and 
Plumas County are now offering education courses to their former inmates, using public and private 
funding.  See, e.g., Debra Moore, Parolee Reentry Program Gains Momentum, PLUMAS COUNTY 
NEWS, Apr. 1, 2013, available at www.plumasnews.com/~plumas6/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=10801:parolee-reentry-program-gains-momentum&catid=69:-headline-
news&Itemid=6. 
 198 EXEC. COMM. OF THE CMTY CORR. EXEC. P’SHIP., COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE PUBLIC SAFETY 
REALIGNMENT & POST-RELEASE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN UPDATE (Mar. 
12, 2013), available at www.probation.co.riverside.ca.us/pdf/ccpec/County_of_Riverside_ 
ounty To 
The plan discusses the 
roba Department, the challenges of 
ansp ed to build more reentry housing. 
Public_Safety_Realignment_&_PRCS_Implementation_Plan_Update_031213.pdf. 
 199 Id. at 3. 
 200 Id.  The county is still heavily focused on incarceration. See, e.g., Riverside C
Receive $100 Million for Jail Expansion, SW. RIVERSIDE NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 8, 2012), 
www.swrnn.com/2012/03/08/riverside-county-to-receive-100-million-for-jail-expansion/. 
 201 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT & POST-RELEASE COMMUNITY 
SUPERVISION IMPLEMENTATION FINAL PLAN, supra note 190, at 30-35.  
P tion Department’s partnership with the Mental Health 
tr orting people to services, and the ne
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on compliance with programming proven 
to re
r policy was 
needed.   While A.B. 109 mandates population reduction in a way that 





crea ing could be the desire to provide 
counties with the freedom to respond to the incoming PRCS populations 




gam , education, and probation 
populations, and the State has often shown interest in allowing local 
gove
 
IV.  REHABILITATION PROGRAM GUIDELINES SHOULD BE MANDATORY 
Reducing the flow to prisons requires more than reducing crime 
rates—counties must create probation systems that actually function to 
keep people from returning to prison.202  Realignment should modify the 
Penal Code to include funding requirements for rehabilitation and reentry 
services, to realize the intent of the legislation and to ensure that inmates 
have equal access to available rehabilitative services.  The Probationary 
Subsidy Act of 1965 revealed that counties need more than incentives 
based on how much they reduce the prison population—they need their 
success to be measured based 
duce recidivism.203  S.B. 678 responded to this lesson by requiring 
counties to spend their funding on evidence-based, recidivism-reducing 
programs, yet its progress would have been too slow to meet the Court’s 
population-reduction deadline, and therefore stronge
204
. 678 did not, since it does not provide reentry program incentives
dates, counties may never install the type of programming that w
st people exiting incarceration.  Therefore, the legislation sho
ain stronger program guidelines that counties are required to follow
One reason the State may not have wanted to force counties 
te specific community programm
ey se
ignment funding in a way that allows this flexibility in programm
tion.205  The LAO states that flexibility allows for local innovati
responsiveness to local needs.206  California’s counties span t
ut of income, resources, job availability
rnments to tailor programs to their own specific issues.207  However, 
allowing the counties to have so much discretion fails to account for the 
 
 202 For an overview of this concept, see Ball, supra note 28. 
 203 Warren, supra note 21, at 190. 
 (Westlaw 2013). 
note 8, at 3. 
(July 20, 2006), available at www.mhac.org/ 
/C
 204 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)
 205 TAYLOR, supra 
 206 Id. at 15. 
 207 For example, the State gave counties much freedom when it realigned its mental health 
system in 1991.  CAL. MENTAL HEALTH DIRS. ASS’N, HISTORY AND FUNDING SOURCES OF 
CALIFORNIA’S PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 1 
pdf MHDA_History_Mental_Health_Funding.pdf. 
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 language into A.B. 118 (which 
prov
s toward developing stable, evidence-supported housing 
. 
suggested by the ACLU.210 
Pew Center on the States offers similar language in recommending 
 
possibility that counties will not have the political will or means to 
implement these programs.208 
One way the Legislature could provide a one-size-fits-all 
requirement for counties while still allowing local flexibility and control 
would be to incorporate the following
ides the specific funding requirements for A.B. 109): 
If 10% or more of the PRCS population is returning to the county 
homeless (as that word is defined by the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development), the county SHALL put forward at least [a 
specified percentage range] of its funding designated for probationary 
program
programs for the PRCS population. 
Or, 
If 10% or more of the PRCS population is in need of substance-abuse 
treatment, then the county SHALL put forward at least [a specified 
percentage range] of its probationary program funding toward 
evidenced-based substance abuse programs
The specified percentage would be based on the average cost of 
these services per probationer, multiplied by the number of probationers 
transferring from state control who need services.  Of course, as many 
critics have pointed out, realignment does not require counties to collect 
data on their realignment population, and thus it will be difficult for 
counties to know the needs of people in their PRCS systems.209  The 
proposed legislative language here would either (1) require counties to 
base their funding allocation on predicted needs, which many counties 
included in their plans and can be drawn from parolee and county data, 
or (2) be accompanied by requirements for data collection, which is 
that state legislation provide mandatory spending and population 
requirements for how counties utilize “[e]vidence-based programs to 
reduce recidivism.”211  For example, to require counties to provide 
 
 208 See, e.g., Kurlychek, supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 209 See, e.g., HOPPER ET AL., supra note 10, at 41. 
 210 Id. at 9-10. Specifically, the ACLU recommends that the state mandate standardized 
rs to monitor which policies and programs are working to 
duce
collection of data to enable “policy-make
re  recidivism and reliance upon incarceration, and to base policy and budget decisions on those 
findings.” Id. at 41. 
 211 PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, supra note 127. 
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the  because S.B. 678 rewards counties 





services for probationers, Pew recommends such language as the 
following: 
(1) The Agency shall adopt policies, rules and regulations that within 
[four] years of the  effecti
supervised individuals being supervised in accordance with evidence-
based practices. 
(2) Within [four] years of the effective date of this Act, [75%] of State 
monies expended on programs shall be for programs that are in 
accordance with ev
Alternatively, S.B. 678 could be amended to focus its incenti
d funding primarily on rewarding counties for their creation 
essful programs and for demonstrating probationers’ participati
achievement in the programs.213  With the enactment of A.B. 1
legislation has been in conflict
n.214  Now that counties will no longer have the option to send many 
low-level probationers to prison, S.B. 678 will potentially be rewarding 
counties for retaining offenders that counties have no choice but to 
keep.215  In fact, recently the State has dramatically reduced funding for 
S.B. 678 to just under $35 million for the 2013-2014 fiscal year and is 
amid discussions about revising the funding distribution formula.216  
Basing the funding incentives on the counties’ demonstration of creating 
and tracking these programs would make S.B. 678 complement A.B. 109 
rather than conflict with it. 
The Pew Center offers exemplary language that, if integrated into 
S.B. 678, would have just this effect.  Pew’s suggested l
tive-based probation reform language would mandate that 
supervision agencies 
 
 212 Id. ch. 1, 1 (emphasis added). 
 213 In order for this to be most effective, S.B. 678 could be extended to cover the PRCS and 
Mandatory Supervision populations created by realignment. The Administrative Office of the Courts 
recommends this. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 73, at 38. 
214  TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 15. 
 215 TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 11 (The “realignment of certain adult offenders from the state to 
counties will artificially’ reduce the future percentage of probationers that counties send to state 
) increase the number of individuals on probation and (2) make certain 
ime
’s 2013-2014 budget. 
LOR, supra note 19, at 
 
prison, thereby unintentionally making them eligible for more [S.B. 678] funding.  This is because 
the realignment plan will (1
cr s ineligible for prison sentences.”).  The new budget formula should be released with the 
State
 216 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 73, at 15.  See also TAY
15.
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marily based on the number of 





If the Legislature was serious about fulfilling its stated intent for 
realignment and the Supreme Court’s suggestion to reduce population by 
addressing systemic causes of recidivism through reentry and 
rehabilitation programs, it should have mandated that counties create 
 
set up a system to track and report regularly on key performance 
measures as defined by the American Correctional Association.  The 
measures are: recidivism, employment, substance use, payment of 
victim restitution, compliance with “no contact” orders, and the 
overall performance of supervised individuals as measured by the type 
of discharge from supervision.217 
Instead of measuring success pri
probationers c
d on the success of probationers within a county’s reentry system.218  
For example, Pew suggests that measuring (and then subsequently 
rewarding) counties’ success based on their creation of substance abuse 
treatment programs would require counties to report to a state agency the 
“[n]umber of offender substance abuse tests for which the results were 
negative in the past 12 months divided by the number of tests 
administered in the past 12 months.”219  S.B. 678 could be amended to 
include similar language and to broaden its measurements of success to 
include housing and education access for probationers as well. 
It is important that the State provide these funding and program 
development requirements as soon as possible, as realignment is already 
well underway, and reentry and rehabilitation services are already 
needed.  The Legislature erred too far on the side of county autonomy 
and failed to put teeth into the law that would require counties to address 
the needs of their probation and PRCS populations.  For a probationary 
system as loosely structured as is California’s, if the probation 
departments are going to be doing more work than ever—essentially 
bearing the brunt of the State’s prison depopulation efforts—then the 
State should provide more structure to ensure that the counties are 
accomplishing the intended goals of the legislation.  Adding the 
suggested guidelines to A.B. 117 would ensure that counties provide at 
least a minimum of reentry and rehabilitation services to their PRCS and
 217 PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, supra note 127, ch. 5, at 1. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. ch. 5, at 9. 
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reentry programs.  Without these funding requirements, it is unlikely that 
counties will create sufficient reentry systems on their own.  Counties 
have a history of not addressing the needs of their probation population, 
and their response thus far to realignment have generally focused more 
on jails than on creating reentry programs.  But it is these very programs 
that could make realignment work—by keeping probationers from 
returning to jail or prison.  Amending realignment to include funding 
requirements like those suggested above would ensure that state funding 
for realignment is used to augment these services.  Without these 
guidelines, the rhetoric and statutory language of rehabilitation and 
probation reform are hollow and myopic.  As expressed in the quote that 
opens this Comment, this type of confusing or contradictory policy—in 
which rehabilitation is encouraged but not taken seriously enough to 
enforce—causes the State to appear that it was never interested in the 
success of those exiting incarceration.  Realignment becomes nothing 
more than merely shuffling people from prison to jail, and ultimately, 
shuffling the problems that led to realignment in the first place. 
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